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Construal level as a moderator of the role of affective and cognitive attitudes in the 
prediction of health-risk behavioral intentions 
 
 
Abstract 
In two preliminary control checks it was shown that affective attitudes presented 
greater abstraction than cognitive attitudes. Three further studies explored how 
construal level moderated the role of affective and cognitive attitudes in predicting one 
health-promoting behavior (exercising) and two risk behaviors (sleep debt and binge 
drinking). There was a stronger influence of affective attitudes both when participants 
were in abstract (vs. concrete) mindsets induced by a priming task in Studies 1a and 1b, 
and when behavioral intentions were formed for the distant (vs. near) future in Study 2. 
In the case of concrete mindsets the results were inconclusive; the interaction between 
construal level and cognitive attitudes was only marginally significant in Study 1b. The 
present research supports the assertion that in abstract mindsets (vs. concrete mindsets) 
people use more affective attitudes to construe their behavioral intentions. Practical 
implications for health promotion are discussed in the framework of Construal Level 
Theory. 
Keywords: affective attitudes, cognitive attitudes, construal level, health-risk behavioral 
intentions 
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Construal level as a moderator of the role of affective and cognitive attitudes in the 
prediction of health-risk behavioral intentions. 
Many cases of health-promoting and health-risk behaviors present 
intercomponent ambivalence, a kind of “heart vs. mind conflict” which reduces the 
predictive power of psychological models such as the Theory of Planned Behavior 
(Conner & Sparks, 2002). Conner, Povey, Sparks, James and Shepherd (1998) studied 
12 health-risk behaviors very common in young people, and found drinking alcohol (the 
most ambivalent), sleeping 7-8 hours per night and exercising as good examples of 
behaviors in which there were ambivalent attitudes. 
In the case of health-risk behaviors, when there is high intercomponent 
attitudinal ambivalence (e.g., fun but unhealthy, or healthy but boring), affective 
attitudes are usually stronger predictors of intentions than cognitive attitudes (Lawton, 
Conner, & McEachan, 2009; Lawton, Conner, & Parker, 2007; Trafimow & Sheeran, 
1998; Trafimow et al., 2004). The present research extends these findings to the domain 
of Construal Level Theory (CLT; Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007; Trope & 
Liberman, 2003) by showing how the level at which people construe their future 
intentions influences which attitudinal component is used (affective or cognitive). 
According to CLT, individuals use more abstract mental models when they 
represent actions situated in the distant future (versus concrete mental models used to 
represent near-future events). Abstract or high-level construals are relatively simple and 
decontextualized representations focused on superordinate traits and relevant goals; at 
the opposite pole are situated concrete or low-level construals, contextualized and more 
detailed representations that include subordinate features. Liberman and Trope (1998) 
found that superordinate aspects like desirability are valued more when people make 
decisions about the distant future, whereas subordinate aspects such as feasibility are 
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taken more into account when temporal distance decreases. In the same vein, Kivetz and 
Tyler (2007) showed how a more distal time perspective activated the idealistic self 
(i.e., values), but a more proximal time frame focused people on their pragmatic self 
(i.e., practical concerns). 
Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, Liberman and Chaiken (2009), exploring how construal 
level moderated the influence of values on intentions, suggested that this effect could be 
explained in terms of the compatibility principle proposed by Ajzen and Fishbein 
(1977). The compatibility principle states that we obtain better predictions when 
attitudes and behavioral intentions are defined using the same level of specificity. CLT 
(Eyal et al., 2009) proposes that depending on the construal level (e.g., time 
perspective), the same behavior may be construed abstractly (e.g., “snacking”) or 
concretely (e.g., “eating sweets”), and that this difference might affect which predictor 
is more appropriate in each mindset. Thus, Eyal and colleagues (2009) proposed that the 
coherence in construal level between mindset and predictors works as a Lewin-type 
channel factor, increasing the strength of predictions. They found that people are more 
likely to use an abstract construct (e.g., their values) in forming behavioral intentions 
when they are in an abstract mindset, compared with the case of a concrete mindset. 
Consistent with this, in the framework of attitudes, recent results show that people make 
more use of their general attitudes (high-level information) to form intentions when they 
are in an abstract mindset, but that they more often use their detailed past experience 
(low-level information) when they are in a concrete mindset (see Carrera, Muñoz, 
Caballero, Fernández, & Albarracín, 2012b).  
Bearing in mind these previous findings, we are interested in extending CLT to 
the domain of attitudinal components (affective and cognitive attitudes) by testing 
whether predictions from affective and cognitive attitudes are moderated by the 
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construal level at which people construe their future intentions. When people have to 
decide about their future behaviors they form a mental representation of them; in doing 
so, they can focus on different aspects. When they are in an abstract mindset we would 
expect them to use the most abstract construals available, but in a concrete mindset they 
will use the most concrete construals. When predictors and mindset match in construal 
level, predictions will be better than in situations of mismatch.  
To test this hypothesis we need to evaluate the abstraction level of construals 
available for forming behavioral intentions, which in our experiments corresponded to 
affective and cognitive attitudes. Is the affective attitudinal component more abstract 
than the cognitive one? To answer this question, the empirical evidence must be 
carefully analyzed. We consider affective attitudes as abstract construals based on 
abstract affects (beliefs about genuine emotions) (see Bülbül and Menon, 2010; 
Robinson & Clore, 2002). It is very different to feel the pleasure of tasting a Belgian 
chocolate (focusing on concrete properties like its sweet flavor) from appraising a piece 
of chocolate as pleasant (focusing on abstract properties like its sweetness). In the frame 
of affective appeals, Bülbül and Menon (2010) distinguished between abstract affects 
(i.e., de-contextualized, superordinate, and linked to the essence of an object or 
situation) and concrete affects (i.e., contextualized, subordinate, and linked to details 
and situations), each one driving behavioral intentions in different time perspectives 
(longer-term and shorter-term, respectively). Bülbül and Menon (2010) used different 
emotional labels to better tap this difference (e.g., affection as abstract affect versus 
excited as concrete affect); but the same idea can be sustained by changing the task 
required of participants (not the emotional term): when affective evaluations (i.e. 
affective attitudes) are required, people will report abstract affects, but when they are 
faced with an emotional stimulus, they will report their current genuine emotions.  
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According to this reasoning, affective attitudes could be considered a high-level 
construal based more on emotional valence (abstract affects) than on actual emotional 
experiences (concrete affects). When people fill out affective attitudinal scales, they do 
not need to experience concrete emotions as if they were faced with the stimulus in a 
real situation. This difference helps to explain apparent contradictions in CLT: abstract 
affects would be involved when affects drive intentions in a more long-term perspective 
(e.g., Bülbül & Menon, 2010) and when people are more sensitive to affective 
information in abstract mindsets (e.g., Critcher and Ferguson, 2011); but concrete 
affects should be considered when people interact directly with emotional stimuli (see 
Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Van Boven, Kane, McGraw, & Dale, 2010). Thus, affects 
would be abstract construals when people focus on their evaluative value, such as when 
they are used to measure attitudes; on the other hand, they could be considered concrete 
construals when they are used to describe actual phenomenological experiences.  
The cognitive component of attitude in health-risk behaviors, such as 
evaluations, could also be considered an abstract concept, but given that in the 
behaviors studied here the evaluations refer to physically detectable health 
consequences that can be observed directly (e.g., obesity) or indirectly using medical 
tests (such as blood tests), then their abstractness may decrease, so that they come closer 
to concreteness. As Semin and Fiedler (1988) pointed out, abstractness is a matter of 
degree rather than an absolute concept, and Trope and Liberman (2010), setting out 
their basic assumptions of CLT, stressed that there are multiple levels of abstractness. 
The Present Research 
In the present research two preliminary control checks (see Study 1a) were 
designed in order to better evaluate the level of abstractness-concreteness presented by 
affective and cognitive terms used for measuring attitudes towards health-risk 
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behaviors. We first tested whether the affective adjectives classically used to measure 
affective attitudes were more abstract than the cognitive ones by asking people to assess 
them for abstractness-concreteness on a 7-point scale.  Second, following Semin and 
Fiedler’s (1988) proposal, we measured abstraction in attitudinal adjectives by 
evaluating their level of verifiability and disputability. All these results showed that 
affective terms presented higher abstraction than cognitive ones.  
Taking into account these previous checks and the CLT findings described 
above, we expect people in abstract mindsets (vs. concrete mindsets) to use the most 
abstract information available to construe their behavioral intentions. In our design this 
will be the affective component of attitudes. Correspondingly, we expect cognitive 
attitudes, lower in abstraction, to better predict behavioral intentions in concrete 
mindsets.  
We selected one health-promoting behavior (exercising) and two risk behaviors 
(sleep debt and binge drinking) in order to examine how construal level moderates the 
role of affective and cognitive attitudes in predicting health-risk behavioral intentions. 
To test these hypotheses we manipulated construal level through a priming task 
developed by Freitas, Gollwitzer and Trope (2004) in Study 1a and Study 1b, and in 
Study 2 by varying temporal distance (Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002). In all 
three studies, before manipulating construal level, participants were asked to report their 
affective and cognitive attitudes, separately, toward exercising (Study 1a), sleep debt 
(Study 1b) and binge drinking (Study 2). Future intentions were measured in the usual 
way by means of rating scales, with the exception of Study 2, where to measure 
behavioral intentions to drink we used the “Simulated Drinking Behavior Scale” 
(SDBS), a new instrument validated in a previous control study. 
     Study 1a 
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In the present study we explore how affective and cognitive attitudes toward a 
health-promotion behavior “doing any type of exercise for at least 20 minutes, three 
times per week” predict intention to exercise, and how their influence is moderated by 
the construal level activated in the mindset (abstract versus concrete). We expect 
affective attitudes to play a more important role in predictions when participants are in 
an abstract mindset, and correspondingly, we expect cognitive attitudes to better predict 
intentions in a concrete mindset. 
We manipulated construal level using the Freitas et al. (2004) task. In this 
experiment we asked about intention to do exercise during one’s holidays. We chose 
holidays in order to avoid limitations related to schedules.  
Method 
Participants.  
Participants were 87 (average age 18.88 years, SD = 1.52) psychology students 
(62 females), randomly assigned to each construal level condition (29 women and 14 
men in the abstract condition and 33 women and 11 men in the concrete condition).  
Preliminary control checks.  
Before testing the effect of construal level on the predictive power of affective 
and cognitive attitudes, we needed to test whether the affective terms used to measure 
affective attitudes were more abstract than the cognitive ones. We selected the 
following adjectives to be tested: pleasant, enjoyable, agreeable, unpleasant, boring 
and disagreeable for affective attitudes, and healthy, beneficial, safe, unhealthy, unsafe 
and harmful for cognitive attitudes. These terms were selected following previous work 
on affective-cognitive discrepancies, such as that of Crites, Fabrigar and Petty (1994), 
who offered suggestions on how to properly measure affective attitudes (e.g., enjoyable, 
bored, delighted) and cognitive attitudes (e.g., safe, beneficial, unsafe, harmful, 
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unhealthy), and also in line with some of the affective scales used by Lawton et al. 
(2009) (e.g., enjoyable) and by Sparks, Hedderley and Shepherd (1992) (e.g., pleasant, 
unpleasant). All such work highlights the differences between affective and cognitive 
attitudinal components. We added a Spanish synonym and antonym of pleasant (i.e., 
agreeable-disagreeable). These terms are frequently used by researchers in the area of 
attitudes 
In the first control check participants were twenty-eight university students (14 
women, average age 21.11 years, SD = 2.83). They were required to rate each affective 
and cognitive attitudinal term presented in Spanish (Spanish/English items: 
placentero/pleasant, divertido/enjoyable, agradable/agreeable, 
displacentero/unpleasant, aburrido/boring and desagradable/disagreeable; and 
saludable/healthy, beneficioso/beneficial, seguro/safe, perjudicial/unhealthy, 
inseguro/unsafe and dañino/harmful) on a bipolar 7-point scale ranging from clearly 
concrete (1) to clearly abstract (7). Prior to this they had been provided with a 
definition of concreteness and abstractness following the instructions used by Paivio 
and colleagues (1968) and by Algarabel (1996)1. All adjectives (affective and cognitive) 
were presented in random order (two versions).  
 We averaged affective and cognitive terms in order to obtain an abstraction 
index for each type of information. A repeated-measures analysis of variance revealed 
that affective adjectives were judged as more abstract than cognitive ones (F (1, 27) = 
22.73, p < .001, p2 = .46; Maffective terms = 4.12, SDaffective terms = 1.04 and Mcognitive terms = 
2.97, SDcognitive terms = 0.80). Affective terms presented higher levels of abstraction than 
cognitive ones. We found no differences between the two versions of the order (Fs > 
0.15, ns). 
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Since differences in abstractness between affective and cognitive attitudes form 
the basis of our reasoning, we carried out a second control check in order to better 
support the difference found in the previous one. Following Semin and Fiedler’s (1988) 
criteria about verifiability and disputability for distinguishing abstraction level (low 
verifiability and high disputability mean higher abstraction), we asked sixty-five 
participants (45 women, average age 18.13 years, SD = 3.42) to rate in both dimensions 
all the attitudinal terms selected. Adjectives were presented in random order (two 
versions). Verifiability was indicated by participants’ answers to the question “To what 
extent do you think that this feature can be objectively measured?”, and disputability by 
answers to “To what extent do you think that different people will disagree on assigning 
this feature to a behaviour?” Both questions were evaluated on 5-point scales ranging 
from not at all (1) to very much (5). A repeated-measures analysis of variance showed 
that affective terms presented lower verifiability levels than cognitive terms, (F (1, 64) 
= 73.81, p < .001,  p 2 = .53; Maffective terms = 3.14, SDaffective terms = 0.70 and Mcognitive terms 
= 3.99, SDcognitive terms = 0.49); and higher disputability,(F (1, 64) = 100.85, p < .001,  p 2 
= .61; Maffective terms = 3.08, SDaffective terms = 0.66 and Mcognitive terms = 2.26, SDcognitive terms = 
0.56). We did not find any differences between the two versions of the order (Fs > 0.10, 
ns).  
In sum, these results supported the assertion that the affective terms tested are 
more abstract than the cognitive ones. Considering the middle point in the scales, we 
must admit that the data collected in these checks show the affective terms to be 
moderately abstract and the cognitive ones to be concrete. Bearing in mind that 
abstractness is a matter of degree, and focusing on the matching hypothesis proposed, 
we would like to highlight the significant differences found in abstraction level between 
the two types of adjectives.  
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Procedure and measures.  
In the first part of the session, using 7-point scales, attitudes towards “doing any 
type of exercise for at least 20 minutes, three times per week” were measured using the 
items tested in the preliminary control checks (pleasant, enjoyable, agreeable, 
unpleasant, boring and disagreeable for affective attitudes, and healthy, beneficial, safe, 
unhealthy, unsafe and harmful for cognitive attitudes). Participants reported their 
attitudes on scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Cronbach’s alphas were 
adequate (.91 and .75 for affective and cognitive attitudes, respectively). Affective and 
cognitive attitudinal indexes were calculated averaging affective and cognitive items 
separately (recoding negative terms). 
We manipulated construal levels by using a direct prime developed by Freitas et 
al. (2004). Previous extensive research (see Wakslak & Trope, 2009) suggests that 
expressing why one performs a behavior temporarily induces higher-level construals (an 
abstract mindset), whereas expressing how one performs a behavior temporarily elicits 
lower-level construals (a concrete mindset). Following Freitas and collaborators (2004), 
participants were asked to answer a set of questions about improving and maintaining 
good health. After being randomly assigned to one of the two construal level conditions, 
in the abstract mindset condition they were asked to consider why they would engage in 
health improvement activity, whereas in the concrete mindset condition they were 
required to consider how they would engage in the same activity. In Freitas’ procedure, 
why and how questions were presented with a diagram of vertically-aligned boxes 
connected by arrows: in the abstract condition the first sentence “improving and 
maintaining good health” was situated at the bottom of the page and the four boxes in 
which participants had to write their answers were connected by upward arrows 
preceded by the why question; in the concrete condition, on the other hand, the first 
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sentence was situated at the top of the page and the four boxes were connected by 
downward arrows preceded by the how question. As an introduction to the mindset 
prime we offer the same examples used by Freitas and colleagues (2004; Experiment 1). 
These instructions maintain constant the content domain, varying only the construal 
level. After reading the example, participants had to answer the why (abstract prime) or 
how (concrete prime) questions about improving and maintaining good health presented 
with the diagram described above. Finally, participants were asked to report their 
behavioral intention to exercise for at least 20 minutes, two times per week during 
holiday periods on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
Participants were then debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
 
Results and Discussion 
We did not find differences in affective attitudes, cognitive attitudes or intention 
to do exercise between experimental conditions (all Fs < .82, ns). Following Sparks and 
colleagues (1992), for assessing affective-cognitive ambivalence we measured affective 
and cognitive attitudes separately, and then computed the absolute difference between 
the sum of those rating scales with a more cognitive emphasis (e.g., healthy) and those 
with a more affective emphasis (e.g., pleasant), all of them recoded at the positive pole.  
Higher scores on this measure indicate higher levels of ambivalence. We obtained a 
low-medium and similar level of affective-cognitive ambivalence in the two conditions 
(F (1, 85) = 0.15, p = .69; Mabstract mindset = 1.37, SDabstract mindset = 1.17 and Mconcrete mindset 
= 1.46, SDconcrete mindset = 1.08). The correlation between affective and cognitive attitudes 
was moderate and significant (r (87) = .29, p < .01). 
To test whether affective attitudes are a stronger predictor of behavioral 
intentions when people are in an abstract mindset, and whether cognitive attitudes better 
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predict intention in a concrete mindset, we computed several hierarchical regressions 
(centered variables). We regressed behavioral intention to exercise on the main effects 
of affective attitudes, on cognitive attitudes (both centered), on construal level (dummy 
coded: concrete as 0 and abstract as 1), and on their double and triple interactions. The 
model was significant (Rc
2
 = .15, F (7, 79) = 3.21, p < .01), showing only a significant 
interaction effect between affective attitudes and construal level ( = 0.42, t = 2.60, p < 
.01) (see Table1). 
To gain better knowledge of the moderating role played by construal level on 
affective and cognitive attitudes we calculated simple slopes analyses using the 
ModGraph-I program designed by Jose (2008), with beta weights for each construal 
level condition being used to aid interpretation. Where moderation was demonstrated 
(i.e., affective attitudes × construal level), the simple slopes test revealed that among 
people in the abstract construal condition there was a significant main effect of affective 
attitudes on exercising intentions ( = .35, SD = 0.13, t(81)=2.68, p<.01), but not when 
people were in a concrete mindset (see Table 1). Interaction of construal level and 
cognitive attitudes was not significant, and the simple slopes analysis showed that 
construal level did not influence the relation between cognitive attitudes and intentions 
(see Table 1). 
All of these results support previous findings showing the importance of 
affective attitudes in predicting health behaviors; the novelty of our findings here was to 
reveal how the predictive power of affective attitudes is moderated by the level on 
which people construe their behavioral intentions. Study 1a showed how the higher 
abstractness associated with affective attitudes (supported in preliminary control 
checks) and the abstract mindset in which participants report their future behavioral 
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intentions interact to enhance predictions. However, our predictions about cognitive 
attitudes were not supported.  
Study 1b 
Study 1b was designed to replicate the results of Study 1a with a risk behavior: 
sleep debt. We found no consensual definition for sleep debt, which can refer to 
voluntary sleep-shortening but is also interpreted to include sleep problems such as 
insomnia, nocturnal waking, early waking or non-restorative sleep. In the concept of 
sleep debt our intention was for it to involve the idea of volition, whereby people 
voluntarily reduce the number of hours they sleep so as to do other things (e.g., 
work/leisure activities). When people voluntarily shorten their sleep time, they still do 
not avoid its negative consequences for physical and mental health (Laberg et al., 2011; 
Moo-Estrella et al., 2005; Regestein et al., 2010). For these reasons, lack of sleep may 
be considered a risk behavior at the same level as smoking or speeding. Given that 
numerous studies have proposed adequate sleep time for adults as 6-8 hours per night 
on a regular basis (Lorton et al., 2006), we asked participants questions related to their 
personal experience and attitudes toward “sleep debt, that is, voluntarily (due to 
work/study conditions or travelling or for reasons of leisure) shortening one’s sleep time 
to less than 6-8 hours per day on a regular basis”. In the present study we explored how 
affective and cognitive attitudes toward sleep debt predict future intention to shorten 
sleep time, and how these attitudinal influences were moderated by the construal level 
activated (abstract versus concrete). In the abstract mindset we expect affective attitudes 
to play a more important role in predictions, but in the concrete mindset we expect 
cognitive attitudes (vs. affective attitudes) to play a more central role. 
Method 
Participants.  
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Forty-five students (average age 20 years, SD = 1.79) participated voluntarily in 
this study. Twenty-two students (10 females) were randomly assigned to the abstract 
mindset and the other twenty-three (13 females) to the concrete mindset.  
Procedure and measures. 
First, participants were informed about the definition of sleep debt: “voluntarily 
(due to work/study conditions or travelling or for reasons of leisure) shortening one’s 
sleep time to less than 6-8 hours per day on a regular basis”. They were then asked to 
respond on 7-point scales. We asked them about their personal experience in sleep debt 
to evaluate the relevance of this unhealthy behavior in our sample, using the question 
“How frequently have you decided to shorten your sleep time over the last three months 
/ last week” (ranging from 1 never, to 7 very frequently; r = .60). We also asked them 
about their affective attitudes through their rating of how pleasant, enjoyable, 
agreeable, unpleasant, boring and disagreeable sleep debt was, and about their 
cognitive attitudes by rating how healthy, beneficial, safe, unhealthy, unsafe and 
harmful sleep debt was on scales from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Following the line 
of Study 1a, the affective items used in this study were averaged into an overall 
affective attitudinal index (recoding negative items, Cronbach’s α = .90), and the same 
procedure was calculated for the cognitive attitudinal index (recoding negative items, 
Cronbach’s α = .84). We next introduced Freitas et al.’s priming manipulation described 
in Study 1a. After completing this task, participants reported the extent to which they 
intended and planned (r = .87) to shorten their sleep time (sleep debt) in the coming 
weeks, using scales from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Participants were then 
debriefed and thanked for their participation.  
Results and Discussion 
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We did not find any significant differences between conditions in personal 
experience, affective attitudes, cognitive attitudes or behavioral intentions (all Fs < 1.32, 
ns). Affective-cognitive ambivalence (i.e., Sparks et al., 1995 formula) was low and 
similar between conditions (F (1, 43) = 0.11, p = .73; Mabstract mindset = 1.07, SDabstract 
mindset = 0.98 and Mconcrete mindset = 0.98, SDconcrete mindset = 0.77). The correlation between 
affective and cognitive attitudes was high and significant (r (45) = .54, p < .001). High 
levels of personal experience were found in both conditions, so that this risk behavior 
can be considered relevant in our sample (F (1, 43) = 1.33, p = .25; Mabstract mindset = 
4.29, SDabstract mindset = 1.76 and Mconcrete mindset = 4.84, SDconcrete mindset = 1.44).  
We carried out a hierarchical regression in which construal level (dummy coded: 
concrete as 0 and abstract as 1), affective and cognitive attitudes (centered) and their 
double and triple interactions were entered simultaneously while controlling past 
experience (centered) to predict behavioral intentions in relation to sleep debt. Past 
experience is an important predictor in health-risk behaviors (see Albarracín & Wyer, 
2000), so it was included as a control. The model was significant (Rc
2 = .26, F (8, 36) = 
2.88, p<.01), past experience being highly significant ( = .50, t = 3.40, p <.001), as 
well as the interaction between construal level and affective attitudes ( = .52, t = 2.33, 
p <.05); however, the interaction between construal level and cognitive attitudes was 
marginally significant ( = -.34, t = -1.50, p=.14). Simple slopes analysis marginally 
revealed that when participants were in an abstract mindset they used their affective 
attitudes to form their behavioral intentions in relation to sleep debt (see Table 2). 
Study 2 
Study 2 was designed to replicate these previous findings with two novelties: a) 
using a more realistic measure of binge drinking intentions, the “Simulated Drinking 
Behavior Scale” (SDBS), and b) manipulating construal level indirectly by varying 
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temporal distance. Thus, instead of asking about behavioral intentions using the 
classical rating scales, intention to drink was now measured by a simulation procedure 
designed specifically to evaluate binge drinking dispositions at a party with free alcohol. 
This is a more contextualized measure, closer to real behavior (i.e., high ecological 
validity). To better replicate previous results we also decided to change the task for  
inducing construal level, temporal perspective (distant vs. near future) being the major 
determinant of which level of construal is activated (Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 
2002). According to CLT, people make higher-level construals of events that are 
expected to occur in the distant future, and detailed and contextualized representations 
of near-future events. We expect that in the distant-future condition (one year from 
now) participants will more likely use their affective attitudes to decide about their 
intentions to drink than in the near-future condition (next weekend), where they would 
use more their cognitive attitudes. 
Method 
Participants.  
Sixty-nine undergraduates (average age 20.89 years, SD = 2.55) participated 
voluntarily in this study. Thirty-five (22 females) were randomly assigned to the distant-
future condition (i.e., abstract construal level) and the other thirty-four students (15 
females) to the near-future condition (i.e., concrete construal level). 
Procedure and measures.  
To better test attitudes towards binge drinking we followed the 
recommendations of the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA, 
2003), to define binge-drinking as 5 or more consecutive drinks for males, and 4 or 
more consecutive drinks for females. These criteria are similar to those set down by the 
Spanish Ministry of Health, which defines excessive drinking as more than 30 gr. of 
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alcohol per day for males and 20 gr. of alcohol per day for women (a mixed drink, such 
as rum and coke, usually contains around 10 gr. of alcohol). Participants were required 
to read this binge drinking definition and to answer questions about their personal 
experience and their affective and cognitive attitudes towards it. We used 7-point scales 
to ask about their personal experience (ranging from 1 never to 7 very frequently) in 
binge drinking: “How often have you drunk excessively in your life / in the last year?” 
(r = .80). To measure affective attitudes towards binge drinking, participants had to 
report how pleasant, enjoyable, unpleasant, boring (recoding negative items, 
Cronbach’s α = .73), and for cognitive attitudes how healthy, beneficial, unhealthy, 
harmful (recoding negative items, Cronbach’s α = .78) binge drinking was on scales 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much)2. The affective attitudinal index and 
cognitive attitudinal index were calculated by averaging affective and cognitive terms, 
respectively (recoding negative items in both indexes). We then measured intention to 
drink alcohol using the “Simulated Drinking Behavior Scale” (SDBS). In this scale we 
included construal level manipulation (distant future versus near future). Participants 
had to answer the following questions: “Suppose you are at a party where the alcohol is 
free and they are playing your favorite music (a year from now – distant future – versus 
next weekend – near future). You have to prepare your own drink, and to do so you can 
choose any non-alcoholic beverage, a long drink mixing any soft drink (coke, orange 
juice, etc.) with any spirit (whisky, vodka, etc.), or a neat alcoholic drink”. All 
participants chose the second option, mixed drinks. Participants were then asked to 
report their intention to drink by marking how much alcohol they would add on a 
drawing simulating a glass (no ice), with six marks indicating a range of 5 to 30 
centiliters (see Appendix 1). There was a photograph of a real glass next to the drawing. 
After marking the quantity of alcohol, participants had to report how many of such 
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drinks they would be prepared to drink at the party a year from now (distant 
future)/next weekend (near future). They were then debriefed and thanked for their 
participation. The results showed that participants (most of them women) chose a mean 
of 5.39 (SD = 2.24) mixed drinks, matching the binge drinking level.  
Control check.  
In a control study we had checked the validity of the new measure called 
“Simulated Drinking Behavior Scale” (SDBS) by calculating its correlations with 
personal experience and behavioral intention for binge drinking. Participants were 199 
undergraduate students (177 women, average age 21.01 years, SD = 1.11). They were 
asked, using a 7-point-scale response format: “How frequently have you drunk alcohol 
to excess (binge drinking)?” (M = 3.40, SD = 1.24); this question was used in 
conjunction with the standard item employed for measuring behavioral intention in 
attitude research: “To what extent would you drink excessively at a party where the 
alcohol was free?” (M = 2.22, SD = 1.41). Behavioral intention to drink alcohol was 
then also measured by means of the “Simulated Drinking Behavior Scale” described 
above. We did not mention the time perspective in any of the measures. The results (all 
variables were standardized) showed a significant correlation between intentions to 
drink as measured by the “Simulated Drinking Behavior Scale” (SDBS) and personal 
experience in binge drinking (r (199) = .46, p < .001), and also – and most importantly – 
between intentions to drink measured by the SDBS and the typical rating scale used in 
previous research to measure behavioral intention to drink excessively (r (199) = .40, p < 
.001). These correlations lend support to the SDBS as a robust measure for evaluating 
future drinking intention.  
    Results and Discussion 
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We found no differences between the distant and near-future conditions in 
personal experience, affective attitudes, cognitive attitudes or intention to drink (all Fs < 
2.55, ns). As in Studies 1a and 1b, we calculated affective-cognitive ambivalence (i.e., 
Sparks et al., 1995 formula); this result showed no differences between experimental 
conditions (F (1, 67) = 0.18, p = .67), and the level of affective-cognitive ambivalence 
was low (Mdistant = 0.96, SDdistant = 0.67 and Mnear = 1.05, SDnear = 0.90). The 
correlation between affective and cognitive attitudes was high and significant (r (69) = 
.57, p < .001). Personal experience was moderate in both conditions (Mdistant-future = 3.05, 
SDdistant-future = 1.47 and Mnear-future = 3.25, SDnear-future = 1.52).  
To test the moderation effect we carried out the same regression analysis used in 
previous studies. Intention to drink as measured by the SDBS was regressed on 
temporal distance (dummy coded: near future as 0 and distant future as 1), on affective 
and cognitive attitudes and on their double and triple interactions. The importance of 
past behavior for predicting binge drinking has been shown in previous research (see 
Carrera et al., 2011, 2012a, b), so it was included in the analysis as a control. The model 
was clearly significant (Rc
2= .30, F (8, 60) = 4.64, p < .001): personal experience ( = 
.43, t = 3.74, p< .001), affective attitudes ( = .24, t = 1.96, p= .054) and the interaction 
of affective attitudes with temporal distance ( = .22, t = 2.06, p< .05) were significant 
(see Table 3). Cognitive attitudes were not significant. Simple slopes tests showed that 
among people in the distant future condition (i.e., abstract mindset), there was a 
significant main effect of affective attitudes on drinking intentions ( = .46, SD = 0.16, 
t(64)=2.73, p<.001). The more positive the affective attitudes towards binge drinking, 
the more likely participants were to be well-disposed to drink excessively in the distant 
future (see Table 3), but this relation was marginal for predictions concerning the near 
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future ( = .23, SD = 0.11, t(64)=1.90, p=.053). Simple slopes analysis did not support 
the moderation effect in cognitive attitudes (see Table 3). 
All in all, the results found in these previous three studies supported the 
hypothesis that affective attitudes predicted participants’ behavioral intentions only for 
the abstract mindset, but not at a concrete construal level. However, simple slopes 
analysis showed that this relation was only marginally significant in Study 1b. In order 
to clarify these differences we conducted a meta-analysis taking together all correlations 
between affective attitudes and behavioral intentions3. When an abstract prime was 
induced, the Pearson’s correlations (see Tables 1-3) between affective attitudes and 
intentions were significant in two studies (Study 1a and Study 2), but not in Study 1b. In 
the concrete condition the correlations between affective predictor and intention were 
never significant. Meta-analysis provides procedures that allow the combination of 
independent estimates of some magnitude (Cooper, Hedges, & Valentine, 2009). The 
magnitude is usually an index of effect size (Ellis, 2010; Grissom & Kim, 2012; Kelley, 
& Preacher, 2012), but meta-analytical techniques can also be applied in other contexts, 
such as that of the psychometric properties of measurement tools (Botella, Suero, & 
Gambara, 2010; Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). We used a random-effects model, which is 
considered more suitable and credible than a fixed-effects model (Borenstein, Hedges, 
Higgins, & Rothstein, 2010). On calculating the combined correlation (weighted by the 
inverses of their variances) and the corresponding confidence interval, we found that 
when the prime was abstract the combined correlation was statistically significant (r = 
.511; 95% CI: .647; .344) but that in the concrete prime condition it was not (r = .001; 
95% CI: .206; -.205). The interval does not contain the zero value in the first condition, 
but it is included in the second one. This result supports the hypothesis that there is a 
significant association in the abstract mindsets but not in the concrete mindsets. 
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Furthermore, the intervals do not overlap a result which, as expected, supports the 
assertion that there is a higher correlation between affective attitudes and behavioral 
intentions under an abstract prime than under a concrete prime. 
General Discussion 
 In the field of health-risk behaviors, affective attitudes have been identified as 
stronger predictors of intentions and behaviors than cognitive ones (Lawton, et al., 
2007, 2009; Trafimow & Sheeran, 1998; Trafimow et al., 2004). In parallel, Construal 
Level Theory (Liberman et al., 2007; Trope & Liberman, 2003) offers robust empirical 
evidence about the influence of construal level on how actions are mentally represented. 
The present research builds on these two perspectives, focusing on how construal level 
moderates the role of affective and cognitive attitudes in the prediction of health-risk 
behavioral intentions. 
Previous findings had shown that construal level moderated the weight of values 
in decisions, which was greater in abstract mindsets (see Eyal et al., 2009). This 
influence between values and abstract thinking was explained by the principle of 
compatibility in construal level between predictors and mindset. The present research 
extended this principle to attitudinal components (affective and cognitive).  
Our proposal is based on the notion that affective attitudes are affective 
appraisals, and therefore abstract affects focus on the desirability of an action or object, 
which cannot necessarily be linked to genuinely-experienced concrete emotions. The 
affective terms used in attitudinal scales allow participants to evaluate the affective 
components of attitudes, but such use does not mean that these same labels might not be 
used to describe actually-experienced concrete emotions if employed in tasks not 
involving mere evaluation. This difference is supported by previous research that 
distinguishes between abstract affects and concrete affects (see Bülbül & Menon, 2010), 
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or that which differentiates between abstract appraisals based on the desirability of an 
action and vivid emotional experience resulting from being faced with a real stimulus 
(Critcher & Ferguson, 2011). Taking into account the fact that affects can be abstract or 
concrete helps us to explain some contradictions, such as why thinking in an abstract 
way about moral behaviors sometimes leads to more extreme affective-moral judgments 
(e.g., Agerström & Björklund, 2009; Liberman & Trope, 2008) , while on other 
occasions we find such extreme judgments in concrete conditions (e.g., Gong & Medin, 
2012).  
We found that affective attitudes were more abstract concepts than cognitive 
attitudes (control checks in Study 1a), so we expected that affective attitudes would 
better predict behavioral intentions when people were in abstract mindsets or using 
distal perspectives (abstract construal level). Following this reasoning, we also 
hypothesized a parallel effect in the case of cognitive attitudes, whereby when people 
were in concrete mindsets or using proximal perspectives, then cognitive attitudes 
would be the best predictor. 
When the compatibility hypothesis in construal level was tested, our results 
supported the predictions about affective attitudes in one health-promotion behavior 
(exercising) and two risk behaviors (sleep debt and binge drinking). Construal level 
moderated the influence of affective attitudes on intentions both when we manipulated 
construal level directly (Studies 1a and 1b) and when we did so indirectly by changing 
the temporal distance (Study 2). Examining in detail these results by using simple 
slopes analyses, the moderation effect was found to be supported in Study 1a and Study 
2, and the effect was also close to significance in Study 1b. The marginality of this 
result (Study 1b) could be explained by the sampling effect, and we therefore conducted 
a meta-analysis in order to better test the influence of construal level on affective 
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attitudes. The meta-analysis showed that, taken together, all three studies endorsed the 
view that affective attitudes predict behavioral intentions in abstract mindsets but not in 
concrete ones. 
Results on cognitive attitudes were less conclusive: the interaction between 
construal level and cognitive attitudes was only marginally significant in Study 1b 
(sleep debt); furthermore, the main effect of cognitive attitudes was not significant in 
any of the present studies. This low influence of the cognitive component supports 
previous findings on the prediction of health-risk behaviors where the stronger influence 
of affective attitudes has been shown (see Lawton et al., 2009).   
All in all, the present findings lend support to the notion that affective attitudes 
are more abstract than cognitive ones, and suggest that in the case of affective attitudes 
it is important to consider their interaction with people’s style of thinking (i.e., construal 
level). Under an abstract mindset people use more affective attitudes to form their 
behavioral intention, so that the match in construal level between predictors and mindset 
should be considered in the prediction of health-risk behaviors. 
Implications for behavior change interventions were not the focus of the present 
research, but our results suggest new strategies for improving predictions from attitudes. 
Thus, prevention campaigns could select not only what information (affective or 
cognitive) it is better to highlight, but also how people should think about it (abstract 
style or concrete style). When highly positive affective attitudes towards a health-
promotion behavior are involved, an abstract mindset should be induced; however, if 
affective attitudes are clearly negative towards a protective behavior, then a concrete 
mindset could be more appropriate. These and other possible practical implications 
should be properly tested in future research. 
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 Table 1 
Regression, Correlations and Simple Slopes Analysis (Study 1a)  
 
 
 
Regression Coefficients (Rc
2
 = .15)  Abstract Construal Level  Concrete Construal Level 
Main effect Interaction    Simple Slopes    Simple Slopes 
   r   Low Medium High  r   Low Medium High 
Affective Attitude -.15     .42**  .50***  .35* -.21 .13 .48  -.13  -.12   .07 -.05 -.17 
Cognitive Attitude .13 .10  .44**  .46 -.34 .13 .61   .15    .21 -.26 -.05 .16 
 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05 
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Table 2 
Regression, Correlations and Simple Slopes Analysis (Study 1b)  
 
 
 
Regression Coefficients (Rc
2
 = .26)  Abstract Construal Level  Concrete Construal Level 
Main effect Interaction    Simple Slopes    Simple Slopes 
   r  . Low Medium High  r   Low Medium High 
Affective Attitude  -.42† .52*     .32†  .22† -.16 .04  .25  -.03  -.28†  .25 -.03 -.31 
Cognitive Attitude .30         -.34†  -.06  .26  .22 .04 -.12  .33†  -.17 -.29 -.03  .23 
Past Experience      .50***                
 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; †p<.15 
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Table 3 
Regression, Correlations and Simple Slopes Analysis (Study 2)  
 
 
 
Regression Coefficients (Rc
2
 = .30)  Abstract CL  Concrete Construal Level 
Main effect Interaction    Simple Slopes    Simple Slopes 
   r   Low Medium High  r   Low Medium High 
Affective Attitude  .24† .22*  .62***   .46** -.35 .10 .56   .20     .23† -.26 -.03  .20 
Cognitive Attitude           -.04         .01  .09  -.03  .13 .10 .07  -.04  -.04  .01 -.03 -.07 
Past Experience           .43***                
 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; †p<.15 
 
35 
 
 
Appendix 1: Simulated Drinking Behavior Scale (SDBS) 
 
IMAGINE that you are going to prepare a drink to your liking at a PARTY WITH A 
FREE BAR. 
The drink can be a mix of soft drink/juice with alcohol or just a straight alcoholic drink. 
Please indicate the amount of alcohol (e.g., gin, rum, whisky, vodka) that: 
 you would mix with the soft/drink/juice of your choice, or  
 you would drink without mixing.  
 
Indicate this by filling in the centiliter levels (cl.) to show how much you would put 
in the glass, without including the ice. 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
How many of these mixed drinks or neat alcoholic drinks would you drink at a party 
with a free bar?: ________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
30 cl.  
 
 
 
  
 
25 cl.  
 
 
 
  
 
20 cl.  
 
 
 
  
 
15 cl.  
 
 
 
  
 
10 cl.       
 
 
 
  
 
  5 cl.  
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Footnotes 
1 “Any word that refers to objects, materials, or persons should receive a high 
concreteness rating; any word that refers to an abstract concept that cannot be 
experienced by the sense organs should receive a high abstractness rating. Based on 
your own valuation, you must decide the level of concreteness-abstractness of each term 
presented. There are no right answers: the judgments are personal and subjective”. 
2 The terms used to measure attitudes were fewer than in Studies 1a and 1b, due to an 
error in the questionnaire printing process, but Cronbach’s alphas were acceptable (.73 
and .78 for affective and cognitive terms, respectively). As a manipulation check of this 
shorter list of terms we re-calculated abstraction level using data collected in control 
checks. This shorter list of affective adjectives were judged as more abstract than 
cognitive ones (F (1, 27) = 9.80, p < .01, p2 = .26; Maffective terms = 3.92, SDaffective terms = 
1.14 and Mcognitive terms = 3.04, SDcognitive terms = 0.94); they also presented lower 
verifiability levels than cognitive terms, (F (1, 64) = 75.42, p < .001,  p 2 = .54; Maffective 
terms = 3.15, SDaffective terms = 0.74 and Mcognitive terms = 4.10, SDcognitive terms = 0.54); and 
higher disputability, (F (1, 64) = 122.13, p < .001,  p 2 = .65; Maffective terms = 3.20, 
SDaffective terms = 0.73 and Mcognitive terms = 2.17, SDcognitive terms = 0.59). 
3 The interaction between construal level and cognitive attitudes was only marginally 
significant in Study 1b, so we did not conduct a meta-analysis. 
 
 
 
 
